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UNITED STATES v. O'HAGAN: A RESULTS-ORIENTED
APPROACH TO INSIDER TRADING CASES
INTRODUCTION
The 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act were
created to "embrace a fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philos-
ophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."1 An ani-
mating purpose of the 1934 Act was "to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence."' 2 Throughout the
1980's and 1990's, abuses in the securities markets have gained the
attention of more than just the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). Various reports about these abuses, in particular insider
trading scandals, have become commonplace in the media.3 To com-
bat the abuse of insider trading, the SEC has relied on §§ 10(b) 4 and
14(e) 5 and Rules 10b-5 6 and 14e-37 of the 1934 Act.
1. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994) (citations omitted).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1997).
3. A search of the Wall Street Journal alone under the subject heading of "insider trading"
revealed 781 stories dealing with insider trading violations.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) provides in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). Section 14(e) provides in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manip-
ulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer .... The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative.
Id. Section 14(e), unlike § 10(b), only deals with manipulative or deceptive practices in the
tender offer setting. Id. A tender offer is defined as a public offer to buy a minimum number of
shares of a corporation, usually at a premium over market price, in order to take control of a
corporation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 621 (Pocket ed. 1996). Section 10(b) applies,
however, regardless of whether a tender offer exists for the shares in which the insider-defendant
trades. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1996). Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part that: "It shall be
unlawful for any person ... by the use of any ... national securities exchange ... [t]o engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)(1)-(3). Rule 14e-3 provides in relevant part that:
[I]t shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the
meaning of Section 14(e) of the act for any other person who is in possession of mate-
rial information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason
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Rule 10b-5 liability is based on a duty to disclose which arises from
a specific relationship between the parties and not merely from one's
ability to obtain market information.8 The "classical theory" of this
liability is limited to situations in which the insider has a duty to dis-
close nonpublic material information to his corporation in whose
shares he trades.9 Since Chiarella v. United States,10 the SEC has
urged the Supreme Court to expand 10b-5 liability by accepting the
"misappropriation theory."'" This theory extends liability based on a
breach of a duty to disclose that is owed to the source of the trader's
information. 12 Under this theory, the trader does not have to owe a
duty to the corporation in whose shares he trades or to the party with
whom he trades.13
Prior to O'Hagan, the circuit courts had split over whether the mis-
appropriation theory was a valid extension of Rule 10b-5 liability.
The Seventh, Second, and Ninth Circuits had adopted the theory as a
valid use of Rule 10b-5.14 The Eighth and Fourth circuits, however,
to know is nonpublic ... to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of
such securities.
Id.
8. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
9. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997). The O'Hagan Court said an
insider violates Rule 10b-5 when the insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the
basis of nonpublic, material information. Id. The Court found that such trading is "deceptive"
under § 10(b) because there is a relationship of trust and confidence between the corporation's
shareholders and corporate insiders who have obtained nonpublic information because of their
position with the corporation. Id. The Court then stated that:
The relationship, we recognized, "gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from
trading] because of the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from tak[ing] unfair
advantage of uninformed stockholders." The classical theory applies not only to of-
ficers, directors and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys,
accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a
corporation.
Id. (citations omitted).
10. 445 U.S. 222. This was the first case in which the Court was presented with the misappro-
priation theory, but the Court declined to rule on the validity of the theory because it had not
been submitted to the jury at the trial level. Id. at 235-36.
11. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (sustaining a finding of criminal liability under the
misappropriation theory); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (affirming a 10b-5
violation for conspiracy to trade on confidential information). See infra notes 85-88 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case.
12. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (explaining the implications of the misappropriation theory).
13. Id.
14. See S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 418 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding a "common sense" notion of
fraud in the misappropriation theory and that this notion is consistent with § 10(b) fraud); S.E.C.
v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (accepting the misappropriation theory because it
complied with the fraud requirement of § 10(b)); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d
Cir. 1981) (basing liability on the breach of any duty to disclose by the trader regardless of
whether the trader owes any duty to the corporation in whose shares he trades or to the person
with whom he trades).
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rejected the theory on the basis that it is inconsistent with the lan-
guage of § 10(b). 15 In United States v. O'Hagan,16 the Supreme Court
resolved this dispute in favor of the misappropriation theory.
17
The O'Hagan Court also dealt with § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, which outline liability in the tender of-
fer context. Rule 14e-3 was promulgated by the SEC, pursuant to
§ 14(e), as a means of prohibiting the use of nonpublic material infor-
mation regarding a tender offer. 18 This rule makes it fraudulent for a
person to sell or purchase securities in the target-company of a tender
offer when the person has nonpublic information of the tender offer
regardless of whether the person owes a fiduciary or similar duty to
anyone else.19 In a 1985 case, the Supreme Court ruled that § 14(e)
allows the SEC to prescribe broad rules, but limited this power by
holding that these rules must not change the meaning of "fraud. 20
Three circuits have upheld Rule 14e-3 as a valid use of the SEC's
§ 14(e) rulemaking power.2' The Eighth Circuit became the first cir-
cuit to hold Rule 14e-3 invalid, citing the rule's definition of fraud as
its fatal flaw.22 The Supreme Court's O'Hagan decision has resolved
this dispute in favor of the SEC, but it has limited this part of the
ruling to the particular facts of this case. 23
This Note critically examines the Court's opinion in United States v.
O'Hagan, concluding that the Court adopted a results-oriented ap-
proach to reach a decision that it felt was "fair" and consistent with
the general policies underlying §§ 10(b) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act.
Part I of the Note traces the history and development of insider trad-
ing case law leading up to the O'Hagan decision.24 Part II of the Note
15. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 622 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997) (rejecting the theory because it failed to require a showing of a deception and it failed to
require that the deception be in connection with a securities transaction); United States v. Bryan,
58 F.3d 933, 952-53 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the misappropriation theory as reaching beyond the
meaning of the language of § 10(b)).
16. 117 S. Ct. 2199.
17. Id. at 2213-14.
18. 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (allowing the SEC to regulate
nondeceptive acts as a reasonable means in preventing manipulative acts; however, the manipu-
lative act had to involve a misrepresentation or nondisclosure). See infra notes 116-19 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of this case.
21. See S.E.C. v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding Rule 14e-3 valid as a use of
the rulemaking power of § 14(e)); S.E.C. v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992) (same);
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that § 14(e) allowed the
SEC to make a rule that extended beyond the common law meaning of "fraud").
22. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 624 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
23. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
24. See infra Part 1.
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presents the Court's decision and reasoning.25 Part III critically ana-
lyzes the Court's decision to adopt the misappropriation theory and to
hold Rule 14e-3 valid in the present factual context.26 Specifically,
this part argues that the Court's decision to validate the misappropria-
tion theory is based more on general policy concerns than precedent
or statutory language. This part also argues that the Court's accept-
ance of Rule 14e-3 lacks much reasoned support and leaves the door
open as to how far Rule 14e-3 liability will reach in the future. Part
IV contends that the effectiveness of the misappropriation theory will
be limited and that the Court will eventually extend Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity beyond the misappropriation theory.2 7 This part also asserts that
the future impact and extension of Rule 14e-3 is uncertain. Lastly,
this part suggests that a catch-all rule such as Rule 14e-3, if valid, may
be a more effective tool to combat insider trading than the misappro-
priation theory.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER
TRADING CASELAW
A. State Common Law Dealing with Insider Trading
The common law that existed prior to the 1934 Act did not provide
much of a deterrent to insider trading. Although the laws dealing with
insider trading varied from state-to-state, most state courts held that
insiders owed a duty to the corporation. 28 This duty, however, did not
extend to individual shareholders.2 9 Thus, in most cases shareholders
did not have much recourse when they became victims of insider trad-
ing. If an insider bought stock via the stock exchange, the insider did
not owe a duty to disclose material information to the sellers.30 Fur-
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. Michael J. Voves, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: Improperly Incorporating Common
Law Fiduciary Obligations into § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1015,
1021 (1997).
29. Id. at 1021 n.30 (citing secondary sources that discuss the unwillingness of courts to find a
fiduciary duty between directors/officers and individual stockholders).
30. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660-63 (Mass. 1933). The Court found the burden
on the insider of seeking out the seller to disclose all information to be too onerous.
An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither buy nor sell on
the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation without first seeking out the other
actual ultimate party to the transaction and disclosing to him everything which a court
or jury might later find that he then knew affecting the real or speculative value of such
shares .... Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so onerous that
men of experience and ability will be deterred from accepting such office. Law in its
sanctions is not coextensive with morality. It cannot undertake to put all parties to
every contract on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness.
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thermore, insiders selling stock to another party did not owe a duty to
disclose nonpublic material information to the other party.31
Some jurisdictions, however, did find exceptions to the general
rules.32 In Goodwin v. Agassiz,33 the Massachusetts court found that
a director did not owe a general duty to an individual shareholder, but
it noted that an insider might be liable if the insider actively sought
out and persuaded a stockholder to sell shares to the insider.34 In
Hotchkiss v. Fischer,35 the Kansas Supreme Court required full disclo-
sure by a director or officer when dealing face-to-face with a share-
holder. 36 The final exception to the rule was the "special facts"
exception developed by the Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide.37 In
Strong, the Court said that even when a director does not have a gen-
eral duty to disclose to shareholders, "there are cases where, by rea-
son of the special facts, such duty exists."'38
Id.
31. See Voves, supra note 28, at 1021.
32. Id.
33. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
34. Id. at 660-61. This court held that a director might be liable for fraud for personally seek-
ing out a shareholder from whom to buy shares. Id. "[Wlhere a director personally seeks a
stockholder for the purpose of buying his shares without making disclosure of material facts
within his peculiar knowledge and not within reach of the stockholder, the transaction will be
closely scrutinized and relief may be granted in appropriate instances." See George v. Ford, 36
App. D.C. 315, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (holding insider liable for persuading stockholder to sell his
shares in the corporation).
35. 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
36. Id. at 534. The court, citing § 165 of Restatement of the Law of Trusts, stated that a
director had a duty to "communicate ... all material facts in connection with the transaction
which the [director] knows or should know." Id.
37. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
38. Id. at 431. In this case, the defendant owned three quarters of a sugar company and was
also a director of the compahy. Id. at 421. The company had no funds and was paying no
dividends. Id. at 423. The defendant was in charge of negotiating the sale of company property
to the U.S. government. Id. at 424. The plaintiff decided to put her shares up for sale since the
company was not paying a dividend and the negotiations with the government were dragging on
because the defendant was holding out for a higher price. Id. The defendant secretly purchased
the plaintiff's shares and then agreed to a deal with the government. Id. at 424-25. After the
deal with the government, the price of the company's shares increased ten-fold. Id. at 426.
Based on these facts, the Court found a duty on the part of the defendant, as a director, to
disclose certain facts before purchasing shares in the company. Id. at 434; see Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun criticized the ma-
jority opinion for not stressing the importance of "possession of 'special facts' as a key element
in the duty to disclose." Id. Blackmun then elaborated on the meaning and application of "spe-
cial facts" to situations involving fiduciary relations, saying the doctrine should be applied when
"one party's superior knowledge of essential facts renders a transaction without disclosure inher-
ently unfair." Id.
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More often than not, these exceptions did not apply. The inconsis-
tent and lenient nature of state common law did not provide much
protection against insider trading.
B. Passage of the Securities Exchange Act and the Development of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 Liability
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in response to
abuses in the securities industry, caused in part by ineffective state
laws. 39 This law expressed Congress' intent to promote full disclosure
in securities transactions.40 The subsequent development of Rule 10b-
5 under the 1934 Act has provided a more effective deterrent against
insider trading than the previous state common law.
1. Caselaw Tracing the Development of Rule lob-5
Originally, courts limited the application of Rule 10b-5 to situations
involving nondisclosure where a common law fiduciary duty between
the parties to the transaction required disclosure. 41 The effect of this
early interpretation was to limit liability to traditional insiders. 42 Dur-
ing the 1950's and 1960's, however, the courts gradually expanded lia-
bility under Rule 10b-5. The first sign of the impending expansion of
liability under 10b-5 was made apparent by the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.43 The court found
an implied right to private civil actions under § 10(b), despite the lack
of an express statutory authorization for private remedies under
§ 10(b).44 Five years later, in Speed v. Transamerica, Corp.,as the
court held that an insider owed a fiduciary duty to disclose informa-
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1997); see Shawn J. Lindquist, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: The
Eighth Circuit Throws the Second Strike to the Misappropriation Theory of Rule lOb-5 Liability,
1997 BYU L. REV. 197, 198 (1997). "[I]n an attempt to curtail excessive abuses in the securities
industry, the Seventy-third Congress enacted ... the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Id.
40. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994).
41. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting that Rule
10b-5 was only meant to protect defrauded purchasers or sellers, and that it was not intended to
protect shareholders in general).
42. Timothy Sullivan, Note, We're Still Against Fraud, Aren't We? United States v. O'Hagan:
Trimming the Oak in the Wrong Season, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 197, 204 (1997).
43. 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ("[Tjhe mere omission of an express provision for
civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies."). See also Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1971) (finding an implied private right
of action under Rule 10b-5).
44. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514; see also supra notes 4 & 6 for the text of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
45. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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tion to minority shareholders before trading with these shareholders. 46
The Speed ruling represented a departure from previous decisions lim-
iting the parties to whom an insider owed a fiduciary duty. The SEC
and various courts also found that a fiduciary duty existed when the
insider traded via securities exchanges and sold stock to non-
shareholders.47
The most significant and liberal developments of Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity occurred in Cady, Roberts & Co.48 and S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur.49 In Cady, Roberts & Co., an administrative hearing, the
SEC held that an insider must either abstain from trading securities of
a corporation when the trader has nonpublic material information, or
disclose the nonpublic information before making the trade.50 The
SEC also found that people other than traditional corporate insiders
could violate Rule 10b-5, holding that a duty to disclose applies to any
person who has a "relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose."'
S
Thus, this reading of the 10b-5 language transcended the traditional
insider relationship and broadened liability to cover any relationship
in which inside information is used. This theory of 10b-5 liability be-
came known as the "equality of access" doctrine which holds that no
one market participant should be able to use nonpublic information
for his personal gain.52
46. Id. at 829 (finding that this duty was meant to prevent insiders from taking unfair advan-
tage of minority stockholders); see also McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d
Cir. 1961) (stating that § 10(b) created new liabilities not found in the common law).
47. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The SEC found the defendant liable for
violating Rule 10b-5 even though the trades occurred on a securities exchange. Id. at 914. The
Commission also found that the defendant owed a duty when selling stock to non-shareholders.
Id. at 913. The SEC cited Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (1951), for the proposi-
tion that a director owed a duty to the person to whom he sold. Id. at 914 n.23.
48. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907.
49. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
50. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911-12. This has become known as the "disclose or
abstain" rule.
51. Id. at 911-12. Relying on the "any person" language found in Rule lOb-5, the SEC ex-
tended liability to any person who had access to nonpublic material information. Id. This spread
liability to people other than traditional insiders such as directors, officers and controlling share-
holders of a corporation. Id. The SEC said that these traditional insiders "do not exhaust the
classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation." Id.; see also Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S.
646, 655 n.14 (1983) (finding lawyers, accountants, underwriters and consultants to be liable
under Rule 10b-5 even though they are not insiders in the traditional sense). See infra notes 89-
92 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
52. See Lindquist, supra note 39, at 233 n.32.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Building on Cady, Roberts & Co., the Second Circuit, in Texas Gulf
Sulfur, adopted the "equality of access" doctrine,53 with some caveats,
and held that Rule 10b-5 prohibited almost all trading on inside infor-
mation.54 In this case, a Texas Gulf Sulfur geologist was involved in
the discovery of a large mineral deposit for the company. 55 Subse-
quent to this find but prior to its public announcement, the geologist
and a number of tippees bought shares in the company. 56 The court
found the defendant liable under Rule 10b-5, stating that "anyone in
possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or ... abstain from trading. '57 At the time, this rul-
ing defined the outer reaches of Rule 10b-5 liability. Despite a subse-
quent Supreme Court case that seemed to give a broad reading to
Rule 10b-5, 58 the scope of the rule's liability began to contract in the
1970's as the Court handed down a number of decisions concerning
§ 10(b) liability.
C. The Contraction of Rule 10b-5 Liability and Chiarella v.
United States
In the mid to late 1970's, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope
and liability of Rule 10b-5 in a number of ways, beginning with Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.59 In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court
held that standing to bring suit in civil actions was limited to the pur-
chaser or seller of securities. The Court stated that it based its deci-
sion on the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 60 In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,61 the Court held that 10b-5 liability required an intent to
53. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 (finding that the use of nonpublic information
for other than a corporate purpose when dealing with a person who does not have access to the
same information violates the equality of access doctrine). See also Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV.
322, 354 (1979) (discussing the equality of access theory and its significance); Richard W. Painter
et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading after United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153,
163 n.39 (1998) (discussing the equality of access theory and its development by the In re Cady,
Roberts & Co. and Texas Gulf Sulphur rulings).
54. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. The court stated: "Whether predicated on tradi-
tional fiduciary concepts ..., or on the 'special facts' doctrine ..., the Rule is based in policy on
the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information ...." Id.
55. Id. at 843-47.
56. Id. at 847.
57. Id. at 848 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907).
58. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-154 (1972) (citing
Rule 10b-5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur in finding defendants liable for withholding information that
a reasonable investor might consider important to an investment decision).
59. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
60. Id. at 754-55.
61. 425 U.S. 185 (1983).
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deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 62 The Court once again relied on the
language of § 10(b) and rejected the SEC's argument that the Court
should look only to the effect on investors. 63 In yet another civil case,
Santa Fe Industries v. Green,64 the Court emphasized the importance
of looking to the language of § 10(b) and held that the section's lan-
guage required that there be some sort of deception or manipulation
to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim.65
The Court did not, however, address the substance of § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 until Chiarella v. United States.66 Prior to Chiarella, the
Supreme Court had not clearly explained what constituted an insider
trading violation under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 67 Thus, Chiarella's
importance arose from the fact that it was the Court's first attempt to
clearly define a § 10(b) violation, and as such, it established the frame-
work for analyzing subsequent insider trading cases.
In Chiarella,68 the defendant was an employee of a printing com-
pany that was printing documents containing information about possi-
ble takeovers of various companies.69 The employee had access to
these documents and was able to determine the targets of the tender
offers.70 The employee subsequently bought shares in the target com-
panies and sold the stocks for a $30,000 profit after the announcement
of the tender offers.71
The Court agreed with the Cady, Roberts & Co. decision, holding
that nondisclosure was within the reach of § 10(b) fraud.72 The Court,
however, limited the circumstances from which the duty to disclose
arises, holding that a person with nonpublic material information has
62. Id. at 193. The Court found that negligent conduct alone was not enough for Rule 10b-5
liability, requiring a showing of scienter to impose liability. Id.
63. Id. at 197-99.
64. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
65. Id. at 473-77. The Court stated: "The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Con-
gress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception." Id. at 473. The
Court found that there was no omission or misrepresentation in this case and that therefore,
there could be no manipulation or deception as required by Rule 10b-5. Id. at 474. Finally, the
Court noted that this case involved nothing more than a claim of corporate mismanagement and
that § 10(b) was not created to regulate this type of behavior. Id. Corporate mismanagement,
like all other claims not involving deception or manipulation, was to be dealt with by state law.
Id. at 476-77.
66. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's role in the development of the misappropriation theory.
67. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-29 (discussing the development of insider trading law by
lower courts and administrative agencies rather than by the Supreme Court).
68. 455 U.S. 222.
69. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 230. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text discussing Cady, Roberts & Co.
1998]
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a duty to abstain from trading or disclose the information only if there
is a duty to disclose arising from a fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties to a transaction. 73 The Court also
stated that the mere possession of nonpublic material information
does not automatically give rise to a duty to disclose 74 because not
every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraud under
§ 10(b). 75 Thus, the Court rejected the "equality of access" theory of
Cady, Roberts & Co. and Texas Gulf Sulfur.76 The Court did find,
however, that a breach of a duty to disclose arising from a fiduciary or
similar relationship did constitute a § 10(b) fraud.77
The importance of Chiarella goes beyond its strict holding. The
Court was also presented with the question of the misappropriation
theory and its validity but chose not to address it in this case because
the theory had not been presented to the jury at the trial level.78 Four
justices, including Chief Justice Burger expressed varying degrees of
73. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-33. The Court stressed that the duty to disclose arose only from
a pre-existing fiduciary relationship to disclose. Id. The Court stated: "[T]he duty to disclose
arises when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them."' Id. at 228. The Court
also emphasized, for the first time, that this duty to disclose was based on the common law, and
that if there was no duty to disclose then there would be no liability. Id. at 229. Finally, the
Court said that the relationship of trust and confidence that creates the duty to disclose must be
"between parties to a transaction." Id. at 230. The Court refused to recognize a general duty
between all market participants absent Congressional intent. Id. at 233.
74. Id. at 235.
75. Id. at 232. The Court also reaffirmed the "classical theory" of insider trading in which the
defendant is a typical insider such as a director, officer or controlling shareholder who has access
to nonpublic material information. Id. at 227. The defendant in this type of case has a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of his company. Id. at 228. Undisclosed trading in the shares of his
company based on nonpublic information is a violation under the classical theory. Id. at 227-29.
The Court also followed precedent by holding that an insider has a fiduciary duty to people
buying into the company and holding tippees liable when they know they are using confidential
information. Id. at 227-30.
76. Id. at 233. The Court stated that:
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic infor-
mation. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from the established
doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties, . . . should
not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent. As we have
seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history of § 10(b).
Moreover, neither Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-informa-
tion rule.
Id.
77. Id. at 232-33. The Court determined in this case, however, that the defendant did not owe
a duty to disclose to the sellers of the stock. Id. The Court stated: "No duty could arise from
petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no
prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence." Id. at 232.
78. Id. at 223, 236.
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support for the theory.7 9 As described by Chief Justice Burger, the
theory would find a duty to disclose on the part of a person who has
nonpublic material information because the person has obtained an
informational advantage, not by superior experience or foresight, but
through some unlawful means.80 The Chief Justice, in his dissent,
found that the defendant had unlawfully misappropriated nonpublic
information and therefore had a duty to disclose this information
before trading on it.81 Thus, the nondisclosure in this case would con-
stitute a fraud in connection with a securities trade.8 2 Although this
version of the theory was not adopted in this case, the Court specifi-
cally declined to address the issue, reserving it for another time.
83
From this point forward, the misappropriation theory would be
presented in a number of cases, and ultimately adopted by several
courts of appeal.84
The Court was given an additional opportunity to rule on the valid-
ity of the misappropriation theory in Carpenter v. United States.85 In
Carpenter, the defendant had been convicted under the misappropria-
tion theory for violating Rule 10b-5. 86 The Court affirmed the convic-
tions because it split evenly (4 to 4) on the validity of the
misappropriation theory.87 Neither arguments for nor against the the-
ory were presented in the opinion.88
79. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236, 238-51. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, adopted the theory as a
valid extension of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 240-42 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also
expressed support for the misappropriation theory as defined by the Chief Justice. Id. at 239
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Marshall also accepted the misappropriation
theory as defined by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 245-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However,
they went beyond this theory and accepted the "equality of access" doctrine. Id. Justice Stevens
found merit in arguments both for and against the theory and thought it was wise to leave the
question of the misappropriation theory's validity to another time. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
80. Id. at 240. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger said:
I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean
that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to
disclose that information or to refrain from trading. The language of § 10(b) and of
Rule 10b-5 plainly supports such a reading.
Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 236.
84. See S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); S.E.C. v. Clark 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
85. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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One other important Supreme Court case that reaffirmed the
Chiarella decision was Dirks v. S.E.C.89 In Dirks, the Court stated
that a duty to disclose cannot arise unless the person who traded on
nonpublic information had a relationship of trust and confidence with
the sellers of the securities.90 The Court further stated that "not all
breaches of a fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transac-
tion" fall within the scope of § 10(b). 9' The Court reemphasized the
fact that Rule 10b-5 requires that a manipulation or deception must
occur to violate the rule.92
D. Post-Chiarella Dissatisfaction in the Lower Courts
1. Lower Courts Adopting the Misappropriation Theory
A number of lower courts seemed dissatisfied with the contracted
scope of Rule 10b-5 liability after Chiarella.93 Of these courts, three
circuits adopted the misappropriation theory as a valid extension of
Rule 10b-5 liability. 94 In United States v. Newman,95 the Second Cir-
cuit held that any person who uses nonpublic material information in
breach of a fiduciary or similar duty to any person, in connection with
a securities transaction, is liable under Rule 10b-5. 96 The Ninth Cir-
89. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Unlike Chiarella, Dirks did not deal specifically with the misappro-
priation theory. Id. at 649. In this case, the defendant was a tippee who had received nonpublic
information. Id. The Court said that a tippee's duty to disclose or abstain comes from the infor-
mation source's breach of duty to the company's shareholders. Id. at 655. Thus, the tippee's
liability derives from the source's breach of duty. Id. The Court also stated that it must be
proven that the tippee knew or should have known of the breach. Id. at 660. The Court also
found that accountants, lawyers and consultants may enter into a special fiduciary relationship
with the company when they are given access to nonpublic material information solely for corpo-
rate purposes. Id. at 655 n.14.
90. Id. at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980)).
91. Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1997)). The Court said that
Chiarella stood for the proposition that "only some persons, under some circumstances, will be
barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information." Id. at 657.
92. Id. at 654 (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473).
93. See S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); S.E.C. v. Clark 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); see Linquist, supra note 39, at 206
(discussing the dissatisfaction of some lower courts with Chiarella).
94. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403; Clark, 915 F.2d 439; Newman, 664 F.2d 12. The Third Circuit may
have also implicitly adopted the misappropriation theory. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771
F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985).
95. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. Id. at 17-18. The court found that the defendants' use of confidential information in a
securities trade constituted fraud. Id. at 17. The court said the sullying of the reputation of the
defendants' employers was the equivalent of the defendants stealing the employers' money. Id.
at 17. The court also found that the fraud in this case was connected to a securities trade because
the defendants' sole purpose in misappropriating confidential information was for use in
purchasing shares of takeover targets. Id. at 18.
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cuit, in S.E.C. v. Clark,97 validated the theory, stating that it was con-
sistent with the meaning of fraud under § 10(b). 98 In S.E.C. v.
Cherif,99 the Seventh Circuit adopted the misappropriation theory,
finding a "common sense" notion of fraud in the theory that comports
with the meaning of fraud under § 10(b). 100 The adoption of the mis-
appropriation theory by these courts allowed liability to be placed on
the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant owed a duty to the
shareholders of the company.10' This theory extended the scope of
Rule 10b-5 liability as defined in Chiarella.
2. Two Circuit Courts Reject the Misappropriation Theory
The first court of appeals to reject the misappropriation theory was
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan, 0 2 which found that the
theory was inconsistent with the language of § 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and
previous Supreme Court rulings.10 3 The court said that it was follow-
ing the Chiarella Court's admonition of not going beyond the meaning
of the words found in Rule 10b-5.104
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. O'Hagan,0 5 followed the
lead of the Fourth Circuit in rejecting the misappropriation theory,
declaring that a literal reading of the statute, as required by Chiarella,
was dispositive of this case. 10 6 It found the theory lacking in two re-
spects: (1) the theory did not require deception as required by
§ 10(b); and (2) the theory did not require that the deception be in
connection with a securities transaction. 0 7 The court believed that
the theory made the "in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5
meaningless and allowed for a breach of a fiduciary duty without a
showing of deception. 0 8 Thus, the court rejected this theory for its
97. 915 F.2d 439.
98. Id. at 449.
99. 933 F.2d 403.
100. Id. at 410.
101. See Linquist, supra note 39, at 206-07.
102. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
103. Id. at 943-44. The court rejected the theory because, in the court's opinion, the theory
neither required deception as defined in § 10(b), nor required that the parties wronged be pur-
chasers or sellers of securities. Id. at 944.
104. Id. at 945.
105. 92 F.3d 612 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
106. Id. at 617-19.
107. Id. at 618.
108. Id. The court said the basis for its rejection of the misappropriation theory was "in part,
because it permits the imposition of Section 10b liability based upon the mere breach of a fiduci-
ary duty without a particularized showing of misrepresentation or nondisclosure." Id. The court
also said the theory "permits liability for a breach of duty owed to individuals who are uncon-
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:161
failure to satisfy the requirements explicitly stated in the statute. 109
The circuit split that emerged over the misappropriation theory after
Chiarella has been resolved by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Hagan."10
E. The Creation of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 to Combat Insider
Trading in the Tender Offer Setting
United States v. O'Hagan also discussed § 14(e) of the 1934 Securi-
ties Exchange Act and its attempts to combat insider trading. This
section was patterned after § 10(b) of the Act.' Section 14(e), which
deals specifically with tender offers, also enables the SEC to make
rules enforcing it.112 Pursuant to this power, the SEC promulgated
Rule 14e-3 in 1980,1 3 which requires traders to abstain or disclose
whenever they have nonpublic material information concerning a
tender offer target." 4 Unlike Rule 10b-5, this rule does not base the
disclosure requirement on the presence of a fiduciary or similar
duty.115 The Supreme Court had not ruled on the validity of Rule
nected to and perhaps uninterested in a securities transaction, thus rendering meaningless the 'in
connection with' statutory language." Id.
109. Id. at 622 ("[Tjhe misappropriation theory is not a valid basis upon which to impose
criminal liability under § 10(b).").
110. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997). Section 14(e) uses substantially the same language as § 10(b).
Id. Section 10(b) prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance." Id. Section 14(e) prohibits "any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer." Id. See also Voves, supra
note 28, at 1028-29 for a discussion of the history of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3. A tender offer is
defined as a public offer to buy a minimum number of shares of a corporation, usually at a
premium over market price, in order to take control of a corporation. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 621 (Pocket ed. 1996).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (stating that the SEC can "define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative").
113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1996).
114. Id.
115. Compare § 240.14e-3 (1996) (banning the use of nonpublic information in the tender
offer setting and imposing liability without proof of fraud), with § 240.10b-5 (requiring proof of
fraud or deception). Rule 14e-3 states:
[I]t shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the
meaning of Section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of mate-
rial information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason
to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired
directly or indirectly from the issuer of the securities or an officer, director or employee
of the issuer, to purchase or sell such securities unless such information and its source
are publicly disclosed prior to any purchase or sale.
Section 240.14e-3. There is no mention of any need for a preexisting fiduciary duty. Id. Rule
10b-5, on the other hand, states: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ....
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14e-3 before United States v. O'Hagan, but it did outline the general
scope of § 14(e) in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.116
In Schreiber, the Court stated that the SEC could "regulate non-
deceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed' means of preventing
manipulative acts. 1 17 The SEC could not, however, create rules that
changed the meaning of "fraud. 11 8 In order for an act to be manipu-
lative, it must involve a nondisclosure or misrepresentation as re-
quired by § 10(b).11 9
Although the Supreme Court had not addressed Rule 14e-3's legiti-
macy, a number of circuit courts approvingly addressed this issue in
the early 1990's. In United States v. Chestman,120 the Second Circuit
validated Rule 14e-3 as a proper use of § 14(e)'s rulemaking power
for two reasons. 121 First, Rule 14e-3 was a "reasonably designed"
means for preventing fraud under § 14(e), and second, § 14(e) gave
the SEC the power to define fraudulent acts.122 Two other circuits,
the Seventh and the Fifth, also approved of Rule 14e-3. 123 These
courts stated that it was a "reasonably designed" means of preventing
fraud as outlined in § 14(e).124
Despite the acceptance of Rule 14e-3 by three different circuit
courts, the Eighth Circuit became the first and only court to reject
Rule 14e-3 in United States v. O'Hagan.1 25 The Eighth Circuit said the
rule was invalid because it did not require a fiduciary breach in order
to be violated. 126 This decision created a split in the circuits concern-
ing Rule 14e-3, which was subsequently remedied by the Supreme
Court's United States v. O'Hagan decision.
[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." § 240.10b-5.
116. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
117. Id. at 11 n.il.
118. Id.
119. Id. See also Voves, supra note 28, at 1031 n.99 (discussing the Court's finding that § 14(e)
required nondisclosure just as § 10(b) required nondisclosure).
120. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
121. Id. at 559-60.
122. Id. at 558. In approving § 14(e)'s delegation of fraud defining power to the SEC, the
court said: "The statute explicitly directs the SEC to 'define' fraudulent practices .... It is
difficult to see how the power to 'define' fraud could mean anything less than the power to 'set
forth the meaning of' fraud." Id. In approving Rule 14e-3 as a reasonably designed means, the
court stated: "A delegation of authority to enact rules 'reasonably designed to prevent' fraud,
then, necessarily encompasses the power to proscribe conduct outside the purview of fraud, be it
common law or SEC-defined fraud." Id.
123. See S.E.C v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); S.E.C. v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir.
1992).
124. Maio, 51 F.3d at 635; Peters, 928 F.2d at 1167.
125. 92 F.3d 612, 627 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
126. Id. at 624.
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II. SUBJECT OPINION: UNITED STATES V. OT-AGAN
A. Facts and Procedural History
The defendant, James H. O'Hagan, was a partner at the law firm of
Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis. 127 In 1988, Grand Metropolitan
retained Dorsey & Whitney to represent it in a possible tender offer
for Pillsbury Co. 128 O'Hagan did not work on the Grand Met matter
himself, but he apparently knew of Grand Met's possible tender offer
for Pillsbury Co.129 In August and September of 1988, while Dorsey
& Whitney still represented Grand Met, O'Hagan purchased call op-
tions and common stock in Pillsbury Co. °30 On September 9, 1988,
the firm withdrew its representation of Grand Met.' 31 On October 4,
1988 Grand Met announced its tender offer for Pillsbury Co., after
which the price rose from $39 per share to $60 per share. 132 O'Hagan
then exercised his options at $39 per share and sold all of his stock and
options in Pillsbury for $60 per share. 133 O'Hagan made a profit of
about $4.3 million from the above transactions.134
The SEC then began an investigation into O'Hagan's trading which
resulted in a fifty-seven count indictment against him. 35 The United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota convicted O'Hagan
on all 57 counts of mail fraud, securities fraud and money launder-
ing.136 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently re-
versed the convictions, stating that the misappropriation theory was
not a valid extension of § 10(b), and Rule 14e-3 exceeded the power
given to the SEC under § 14(e). 137 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
idea that § 14(e) gave the SEC the power to define fraudulent. 38 Ac-
cording to the court, the statute only allowed the SEC to prohibit acts
that fell within § 14(e)'s definition of fraud and that the court was to
127. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1997).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2206.
138. United States v. O'Hagan, 91 F.3d 612, 624-25 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997). The court remarked: "A straightforward exercise in statutory construction then affords
no basis for concluding that § 14e authorizes the SEC to create its own definition of fraud." Id.
at 624.
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look to § 10(b) for help in defining fraud. 139 The court found that
fraud under § 10(b) required a breach of a common law fiduciary
duty; therefore, fraud under § 14(e) also required a breach of a fiduci-
ary duty.140 Rule 14e-3, however, does not require a breach of a fidu-
ciary duty for a finding of a fraudulent act, and the court found this
flaw to be fatal to the rule's validity.141 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and decided the case on June 25, 1997.142
B. The Majority Opinion
In a 6 to 3 opinion, the Court held that criminal liability under Rule
10b-5 could be predicated on the misappropriation theory.143 In a 7 to
2 opinion the Court held that Rule 14e-3 was a permissible use of the
SEC's rulemaking power under § 14(e). 144
1. Rule 10b-5 and the Misappropriation Theory
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, first addressed the question
of liability under Rule 10b-5 when based on the misappropriation the-
ory. 145 According to past caselaw, liability under Rule 10b-5 cannot
extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)'s prohibition. 146 The
Court used the "classical theory" of insider trading as an example of
fraud that is prohibited by § 10(b). 1 47 The "classic" corporate insider
has a duty to disclose nonpublic information to shareholders in order
139. Id. at 624-25. The court noted that in Schreiber the Supreme Court said to look to
§ 10(b) when determining fraud under § 14 (e). Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit looked to caselaw
interpreting fraud under § 10(b). Id.
140. Id. at 624-25.
141. Id. at 624. ("[T]he SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority by enacting rule 14e-3(a)
without including the requirement of a breach of a fiduciary duty.").
142. Id.
143. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199, 2206 (1997). Justice Ginsburg wrote the ma-
jority opinion on the misappropriation theory in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter and Breyer joined. Id. at 2204. Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's opinion con-
cerning the misappropriation theory. Id. at 2220. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, also dissented from the majority's opinion on the misappropriation theory. Id.
144. Id. at 2219. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion on Rule 14e-3 in which Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Breyer joined. Id. at 2204. Justice Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the majority's opinion concerning Rule 14e-3.
Id. at 2220.
145. Id. at 2206.
146. Id. at 2207. The Court cited both Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976),
and Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994), for the proposition that
liability under Rule 10b-5 cannot exceed § 10(b)'s prohibition. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
147. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. Under the classical theory, a corporate insider trades in the
shares of his company based on nonpublic material information that the trader has obtained. Id.
The Court has found this type of trading to constitute a "deceptive device" under § 10(b) be-
cause the insider and the shareholders have "a relationship of trust and confidence." Id. This
relationship creates a duty to disclose on the part of the insider in order to prevent the insider
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to prevent the insider from taking unfair advantage of other stock-
holders. 148 The misappropriation theory provides that a person com-
mits fraud "in connection with" a securities trade when he uses
nonpublic information in a trade and does not disclose the use of this
information to his information source. 149 The trader breaches a duty
owed to the source of his information when the trader does not dis-
close the use of the nonpublic information to his source. 150 This duty
of loyalty and confidentiality arises from the fact that the source of the
information has exclusive use of the information as a property right.151
Thus, the trader's undisclosed use of this information for his own
profit defrauds the principal-source of the exclusive use of that infor-
mation.152 Using this reasoning, the Court found that the misappro-
priation theory, like the classical theory, requires a deception or fraud
through nondisclosure when there is a fiduciary duty requiring disclo-
sure. 153 Under this analysis, the misappropriation theory meets the
"fraud" requirement of § 10(b).
The Court proceeded to address the "in connection with" require-
ment of § 10(b). The Court stated that § 10(b) requires that the mis-
appropriator's deceptive use of information be "in connection with" a
securities transaction. 54 It found that this requirement was met be-
cause the fiduciary's fraud was not consummated until the trader used
the nonpublic information to purchase or sell securities without dis-
closing the use of the information to the source. 155 The securities
trade and the breach of duty coincide and therefore, the fraud is "in
from taking unfair advantage of uninformed trading parties. Id. See supra note 9 and accompa-
nying text.
148. Id.
149. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
150. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
151. Id. The Court noted that in Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19 (1987), it had determined that
a company's confidential information is property to which the company has exclusive use.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this case.
152. O'Hagan, 112 S. Ct. at 2207.
153. Id. The Court stated: "In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between
the company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with ac-
cess to confidential information." Id. The Court also noted, however, that full disclosure by the
trader to his source of information would foreclose liability under the misappropriation theory
because the deception or fraud essential to the theory is based on the trader pretending to be
loyal to the source of information. Id. at 2209.
154. Id. at 2209.
155. Id. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (stating that mere possession
of nonpublic information is not a breach of a fiduciary duty). See supra notes 68-71 for a discus-
sion of this case.
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connection with" a securities transaction. 156 The Court also pointed
out that § 10(b) does not require deception of an identifiable pur-
chaser or seller, but rather just a deception in connection with a secur-
ities transaction.1 57
The Court further elaborated on the "in connection with" element,
stating that the misappropriation theory targets information that is or-
dinarily used to gain risk-free profits from securities transactions.158
The targeted type of nonpublic information ordinarily derives its
value from use in securities trading.1 59 Section 10(b) or the misappro-
priation theory, however, do not prohibit uses of nonpublic informa-
tion that are unrelated to securities transactions. 160 The Court
concluded that the theory is consistent with the policy concerns under-
lying § 10(b) because it helps to insure honest securities markets and
promote investor confidence through disclosure.1 61
2. The Scope of § 14(e) and the Validity of Rule 14e-3
The Court then discussed Rule 14e-3 and its validity. In a 7 to 2
opinion the Court held that Rule 14e-3 was a valid exercise of the
SEC's rulemaking power under § 14(e),162 basing its acceptance of
Rule 14e-3 on the proposition that it is a "reasonably designed" means
of preventing fraud in this genre of cases.1 63 The Court refused to
address the question of whether the SEC has broader power to define
"fraud" under § 14(e) than it does under § 10(b).164
156. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. The Court stated that the person defrauded need not be the
other party to the transaction because a fraud can be practiced on one person with resultant
harm to another person. Id.
157. Id. at 2210.
158. Id. at 2209. "The theory does not catch all conceivable forms of fraud involving confi-
dential information; rather, it catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information
through securities transactions." Id.
159. Id. at 2210. The Court rejected the Government's contention that the targeted informa-
tion only has value from use in securities transactions. Id. It said to replace "only" with "ordina-
rily" and the Government's characterization of the type of information to be regulated would be
correct. Id.
160. Id. at 2209.
161. Id.
162. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214.
163. Id. at 2217.
164. Id. at 2215-17. The majority opinion stated: "We need not resolve in this case whether
the Commission's authority under § 14(e) to 'define... fraudulent' is broader than the Commis-
sion's fraud-defining authority under § 10(b)." Id. at 2217. The Court acknowledged that in
Schreiber it had stated that "manipulative" in § 14(e) has the same meaning as it does in § 10(b),
which requires a showing of misrepresentation or nondisclosure for an act to be considered "ma-
nipulative". Id. The Court also noted that § 14(e)'s anti-fraud prohibition was modeled on
§ 10(b)'s antifraud provision which requires that there be a duty to disclose arising from a fiduci-
ary relationship. Id. at 2216.
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In finding Rule 14e-3 to be a reasonably designed means of prevent-
ing fraud, the Court first noted that § 14(e) allows the SEC to pro-
scribe acts that are not fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b) if
the prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent fraud.1 65 In deciding
if the rule is reasonably designed, the Court stated that it must give
the SEC's judgment "more than mere deference," because § 14(e) was
passed by Congress.' 66 Thus, the Court must give the SEC's determi-
nation "controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious or mani-
festly contrary to the statute. ' 167 In this case, the Court decided that
the SEC's determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.168 To support this conclusion, the Court stated
that it was fair to assume that trading based on nonpublic information
will often involve a breach of a duty of confidentiality and that this
breach will be nearly impossible to prove. 169 The Court went on to
assume that the SEC was aware of this proof problem and, therefore,
drafted Rule 14e-3 without requiring proof of a breach of a duty to
disclose. 70 Thus, the Court concluded that Rule 14e-3 was a valid use
of § 14(e)'s rulemaking power as applied to this genre of cases.171
C. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia dissented only from the majority's opinion concerning
the validity of the misappropriation theory.172 In a brief dissent, Jus-
tice Scalia stated that the principle of lenity,173 which is applied to
criminal statutes, required that the § 10(b) deception or manipulation
be worked on a party to the securities transaction. 74 Since the misap-
propriation theory does not require that the deception or manipula-
tion be worked on a party to the transaction, it is inconsistent with
§ 10(b) and the principle of lenity. 75
165. Id. at 2217.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2217-18.
168. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2218.
169. Id. at 2219.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2220.
173. The rule of lenity is defined as a judicial doctrine that calls for the court to resolve an
ambiguous criminal statute with multiple punishments in favor of the more lenient sentence.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (Pocket ed. 1996).
174. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
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D. Justice Thomas' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from
the Court's opinion on both the misappropriation theory and the va-
lidity of Rule 14e-3. 76 Justice Thomas rejected the misappropriation
theory because the Court's explanation of the theory's interpretation
of the "in connection with" element was incoherent and inconsis-
tent.177 He also rejected Rule 14e-3 because the majority did not
show that the rule was preventing any type of underlying fraud.'
78
In discussing the misappropriation theory, Justice Thomas did not
dispute the majority's determination that an undisclosed use of non-
public information by a fiduciary can constitute deception under
§ 10(b). 179 Rather, Justice Thomas believed that the Court's construc-
tion of the "in connection with" element was incoherent and therefore
fatal to the theory's validity. 180 He claimed that the majority's "in
connection with" analysis was actually based on the idea that a misap-
propriation of information is "in connection with" a securities transac-
tion because the information only has value from use in a securities
transaction.1 81 The majority, however, rejected this idea as an "over-
statement" on the part of the government. 182 In support of this con-
tention, Justice Thomas pointed to the majority's classification of the
misappropriation of funds for use in a securities trade as an act
outside the scope of the misappropriation theory because the funds
can be used for things other than a trade.1 83 The fact that these funds
have value to the trader outside of being used in a securities trade
would bar liability based on the misappropriation theory because "the
fraud would be complete as soon as the money was obtained. ' 184 Jus-
tice Thomas further pointed out that the misappropriation of nonpub-
lic information has value outside of being used in a securities
transaction. 185 The undisclosed misappropriation of information is
176. Id. at 2220.
177. Id. at 2220-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2221.
179. Id. Justice Thomas stated that: "Nondisclosure where there is a pre-existing duty to dis-
close satisfies our definitions of fraud and deceit for purposes of the securities laws." Id.
180. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2222.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2210. The majority stated: "The dissent does catch the Government in overstate-
ment .... [T]he Government urges that confidential information of the kind at issue derives its
value only from its utility in securities." Id.
183. Id. at 2222.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2223. Justice Thomas gave examples of uses of misappropriated information
outside of the securities trading context. Id. The misappropriated information could be sold to a
newspaper for profit, it could be sold to Pillsbury Company for profit, or it could be used for
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not necessarily consummated by a securities transaction; therefore the
misappropriation of information does not fall within the Court's con-
struction of the "in connection with" element.18 6
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority's approach to the mis-
appropriation theory for two additional reasons. First, Justice Thomas
said that the majority's position was unacceptable because the Court
created a new theory that the agency itself did not argue.187 Justice
Thomas further objected to the majority's substitution of "ordinarily"
for the government's "only" in describing the amount of "connected-
ness" between the fraud and the securities transaction.188 He stated
that it is a fundamental principle that the Court cannot supply a basis
for an agency's action that the agency did not proffer at oral argu-
ment. 18 9 Second, Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's opinion
because of the misappropriation theory's weakness in furthering the
policies underlying § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 90
Justice Thomas also dissented from the majority's opinion on the
validity of Rule 14e-3. He first stated that § 14(e) only allows the SEC
to regulate fraudulent acts, and that it does not give the SEC the
power to redefine "fraudulent.' 91 Justice Thomas did agree with the
personal amusement in a fantasy stock trading game. Id. Justice Thomas concluded that this
information therefore has value apart from being used in a securities transaction. Id.
186. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2223-24. Justice Thomas noted:
That O'Hagan actually did use the information to purchase securities is thus no more
significant here than it is in the case of embezzling money used to purchase securities.
In both cases the embezzler could have done something else with the property, and
hence the Commission's necessary "connection" under the securities laws would not be
met.
Id. at 2223.
187. Id. at 2224.
I need not address the coherence, or lack thereof, of the majority's new theory, for it
suffers from a far greater, and dispositive, flaw: It is not the theory offered by the Com-
mission. Indeed, as far as we know from the majority's opinion, this new theory has
never been proposed by the Commission, much less adopted by rule or otherwise.
Id.
188. Id. "Thus, we are told, if we merely substitute 'ordinarily' for 'only' when describing the
degree of connectedness between a misappropriation and a securities transaction, the Govern-
ment would have a winner." Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2225-26.
The majority's approach is misleading in this case because it glosses over the fact that
the supposed threat to fair and honest markets, investor confidence, and market integ-
rity comes not from the supposed fraud in this case, but from the mere fact that the
information used by O'Hagan was nonpublic .... Even if it is true that trading on
nonpublic information hurts the public, it is true whether or not there is any deception
of the source of the information.
Id.
191. Id. at 2227-28.
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majority that § 14(e) allows the SEC to prohibit non-fraudulent acts
as a reasonably designed means of preventing fraudulent acts. 192 The
dissenters, however, found that Rule 14e-3 was not an exercise of
§ 14(e)'s prophylactic power.193 Justice Thomas argued that the rule
merely redefined the term "fraudulent" and this redefinition is not
permissible under § 14(e). 194
Justice Thomas then considered Rule 14e-3's validity if it had been
designed as a prophylactic power. He concluded that the rule is not
valid because the misappropriation that the rule is designed to prevent
is not a "legitimate object of prevention" since the misappropriation
theory is not valid under § 10(b).1 95 The dissent further stated that
even if the misappropriation theory was valid under § 10(b), Rule 14e-
3 was not a reasonably designed means for preventing fraud because
there are no particular difficulties in proving a breach of a fiduciary
duty in the tender offer setting.1 96
III. ANALYSIS
The first part of the analysis of United States v. O'Hagan concerns
the misappropriation theory. This Note argues that the acceptance of
the misappropriation theory is based more on policy considerations
than precedent and that the theory will not be entirely effective in
championing these policy concerns. More specifically, this Note ar-
gues that the Court's analysis of the "in connection with" element is
both incomplete and breaks from precedent. The Court searches for
and accepts a fiduciary breach, which historically has not been regu-
lated by the securities laws, to validate the misappropriation theory.
Next, this Note discusses the Court's acceptance of Rule 14e-3 as a
valid use of § 14(e) rulemaking power, arguing that the Court uses a
rational basis test to approve the rule. The Court does not closely
examine Rule 14e-3; rather, it relies on the decisions of lower courts
and the SEC. Finally, this Note asserts that the Court's opinion re-
garding Rule 14e-3 leaves many questions unanswered by limiting that
part of the opinion to the specific facts of this case.
As stated earlier, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was created
to prevent and, when possible, end abuses in the securities markets
192. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2228.
193. Id.
194. Id. Justice Thomas found that the rule did not "purport to be an exercise of the Commis-
sion's prophylactic power, but rather a redefinition of what 'constitute[s]' a fraudulent, decep-
tive, or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of Section 14e." Id.
195. Id. at 2228-29.
196. Id. at 2229.
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through the policy of full disclosure to establish honest markets and
enhance investor confidence. 197 The SEC, through the use of various
provisions of the Act, has made progress in bringing about disclosure
and curbing abuses in the securities markets.198 The Supreme Court
has played a vital role in defining and determining the scope and ef-
fectiveness of the SEC's efforts. 199
In its latest securities regulation case, O'Hagan, the Court has tried
to resolve novel issues in a manner that is consistent with the over-
arching policies of honest markets, investor confidence, and preven-
tion of profiteering.200 The Court's reasoning and decision concerning
the misappropriation theory and Rule 10b-5 attempt to reach a de-
sired result without altering precedent.
A. The Misappropriation Theory: A Technical Hook on Which to
Extend Liability
The Court first addressed the misappropriation theory by discussing
the § 10(b) requirement that a fraud must occur in order to have a
§ 10(b) violation. The Court found that this fraud could be effectu-
ated by nondisclosure when there is a duty to disclose.20' The duty to
disclose in this case arose from the fact that the source of the informa-
tion revealed nonpublic information that the source had an exclusive
right to use.202 Thus, the trader had a duty to inform the source
before using the information because use of the information without
disclosure deprives the source of his exclusive use of the informa-
tion.20 3 The dissenters agreed with the Court's reasoning on this
point, and the point seems well-grounded in precedent.20 4
197. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (1997).
199. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164; Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v.
S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
200. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209. "The theory is well-tuned to an animating purpose of
the Exchange Act: to insure honest markets and thereby promote investor confidence." Id. The
Court also held that "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information" was
a violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 2207.
201. Id. at 2208-09.
202. Id. The Court relied heavily on the Court's decisions in Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, and Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
203. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2208-09.
204. See id. at 2209. The majority stated: "A company's confidential information, we recog-
nized in Carpenter, qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use. The
undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty, the Court said
in Carpenter, constitutes fraud." Id. See id. at 2221. Citing Chiarella, the dissent, said that un-
disclosed misappropriation of confidential information can constitute deception because "non-
disclosure where there is a pre-existing duty to disclose satisfies our definitions of fraud and
deceit for purposes of securities laws." Id.
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The Court's opinion encountered difficulty with precedent when it
discussed the "in connection with" requirement of § 10(b). Prior to
O'Hagan, the seminal case on insider trading and the misappropria-
tion theory was Chiarella.20 5 In Chiarella, the Court specifically left
open the question of the misappropriation theory's validity since it
had not been presented to the jury.20 6 The Chiarella Court, however,
did state in dicta that the duty to disclose was grounded in the rela-
tionship between the parties to the transaction. 20 7 This statement im-
plies that the fraud that occurs in connection with the trade must be
between the parties to the transaction.
The O'Hagan Court maneuvered around this obstacle by claiming
that the "between the parties to the transaction" statement was only a
means to reject the notion that § 10(b) imposed a general duty to dis-
close on all market participants.20 8 The Court stated that it would
therefore limit the "between the parties" statement to that particular
context.20 9 The Court pointed out that the Chiarella Court had left
the misappropriation theory question open and that four justices had
voiced support for the theory.210
The Court was correct that the theory's validity was still an unde-
cided issue, but it simply ignored the meaning of the "between the
parties to the transaction" statement.211 It attached no significance to
the statement, presumably because it was a rather inconvenient prob-
lem for the Court. The Chiarella Court plainly stated that § 10(b)
does not impose a general duty to disclose nonpublic information on
all market participants. 212 The "between the parties to a transaction"
statement does not merely clarify or emphasize the point that § 10(b)
does not impose a general duty to disclose; it goes beyond this point
by limiting the duty to specified people. The "between the parties"
statement is a specific, descriptive statement whereas the other point
is a general premise.
205. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying
text.
206. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
207. Id. at 230 ("[S]uch liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship
of trust and confidence between the parties to a transaction").
208. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2212.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 41-42 for an explanation of this statement.
212. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229. The Court provided an example demonstrating there is no
general duty to disclose nonpublic information. Id. "Accordingly, a purchaser of stock who has
no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to
have no obligation to reveal material facts." Id. The Court also stated: "a duty to disclose under
§ 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic information." Id. at 235.
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The majority dismissed similar statements found in the Dirks opin-
ion by finding that the Dirks Court was reiterating the same state-
ments from Chiarella.213 These comments, of course, were limited to
dispelling the notion that § 10(b) created a general duty to disclose.
The Court also gave little weight to a statement in Central Bank that
implied that the duty to disclose was based on a relationship between
the parties to a transaction.214
While the Court did not show much concern for precedent, it re-
peatedly stressed the importance of the policy considerations underly-
ing § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 215 It emphasized the importance of
securing honest markets and promoting investor confidence and the
effectiveness of the misappropriation theory in securing these goals. 216
The Court's brief treatment of potentially adverse caselaw, apparently
due to its inconvenient nature, implies that the Court knew what re-
sult it was headed for and that it did not want to get caught up in
technical problems caused by precedent. Knowing its desired result,
the Court attempted to work within the established framework of
Rule 10b-5 by showing that the misappropriation theory met the re-
quired elements for a violation. 21 7 Fitting the misappropriation theory
into the established framework proved somewhat difficult, however,
as highlighted by the Court's analysis of the "in connection with" re-
quirement. The majority stated that the § 10(b) fraud need only be in
213. See O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2212-13.
214. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). The Court stated
that:
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipu-
lative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming...
the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.
Id. In O'Hagan, the Court stated that this passage was only meant to show that secondary actors
are subject to primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213. The
Court also downplayed the significance of Central Bank by saying that it was only a private civil
action whereas the present case involved a criminal action. Id.
215. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207-11. "The misappropriation theory is thus designed to
protec[t] the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by outsiders to a corporation." Id.
at 2207. The theory "catches fraudulent means of capitalizing on such information through se-
curities transactions." Id. at 2209. "The Exchange Act was enacted in part 'to insure the mainte-
nance of fair and honest markets,' . . . and there is no question that fraudulent uses of
confidential information fall within § 10b's prohibition." Id. at 2209. "The theory is also well-
tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and
thereby promote investor confidence." Id. at 2210. "Although informational disparity is inevita-
ble in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law." Id. at
2210. "In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on misap-
propriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying § 10b . I..." Id. at 2210-11.
216. Id. at 2207-11.
217. Id.
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connection with a securities transaction and that it did not have to be
between the parties to the transaction.218 While this interpretation
was purportedly based on the specific language of § 10(b), the Court's
definition of the "in connection with" element is incomplete. 219
The Court found that the misappropriation of nonpublic informa-
tion is "in connection with" a securities trade because the misappro-
priation of this type of information is ordinarily valuable when used as
the basis for a securities trade.220 Unlike the misappropriation of non-
public information, the misappropriation of money used to buy securi-
ties is not "in connection with" the securities transaction because the
money could be used for many other purposes and derives value from
other uses.221 The many uses and values of misappropriated money
make it "sufficiently detached" from the trade to prevent it from be-
ing "in connection with" the trade. 222 At best, this is a definition of
"sufficiently detached" and an explanation of what fails to qualify as
"in connection with" a securities transaction. Unfortunately, it does
not define the "in connection with" a securities transaction
requirement.
Aside from being incomplete, the Court's opinion failed to provide
a clear definition of the "in connection with" element. The embezzled
money example implies that misappropriated nonpublic information
falls under the misappropriation theory because it does not have value
or utility outside of the securities transaction context.223 While the
Court admitted that misappropriated nonpublic information does
have some value and use outside of the securities transaction con-
text,224 it did not place much significance on these other uses and
merely stated that the use and value of this information is ordinarily
found in a securities trade.225 This explanation does not offer a work-
able distinction from the misappropriated money example which the
Court found to be sufficiently detached for purposes of liability under
218. Id. at 2210.
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(j) (1997). "It shall be unlawful for any person.., to use or employ[]
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id.
220. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2210; see also id. at 2220 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the
inadequacy of the majority's "in connection with" explanation).
221. Id. at 2209-10.
222. Id. at 2209; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries, Misappropriators and the Murky
Outlines of the Den of Thieves: A Conceptual Continuum for Analyzing United States v.
O'Hagan, 33 TULSA L. J. 163, 172 (1997) (discussing the weakness of the Court's argument about
the difference between misappropriated money and misappropriated information).
223. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
224. Id. at 2210.
225. Id.
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the misappropriation theory.2 26 In lieu of a clear definition, the Court
appears to have provided a value judgment regarding the maximum
utility that something may have outside of its usefulness in a securities
trade, while still being sufficiently connected to the transaction for the
purposes of the misappropriation theory.
In conclusion, the majority's analysis of the "in connection with"
element of § 10(b) contains flaws, but its general premise that the
fraud need only be connected to the securities transaction is consistent
with § 10(b)'s language.227 The Court, however, did not have to give a
literal reading to § 10(b); it could have comfortably relied and built
upon the Chiarella precedent and required that the duty to disclose
arises from relationships between parties to the transaction.22 8 Cer-
tainly reliance on precedent would have avoided the problems the
Court faced in defining the "in connection with" element, but it would
have also limited the liability and reach of Rule 10b-5.
Arguably, the Court did not follow the invitation extended by
Chiarella because of its heavy reliance on policy considerations.229
The Court's desire to promote the underlying policies may have been
due in large part to the particular facts of this case.2 30 In trying to
properly deter activities like O'Hagan's, the Court needed to harmo-
nize § 10(b)'s language and the Chiarella precedent, which states that
§ 10(b) does not impose a general duty to disclose. 231 Therefore, the
majority was forced to find a fiduciary breach in order to extend
liability.2 32
The strained expansion of liability by the O'Hagan Court is not
fully effective in achieving the goals of the SEC, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
226. See supra notes 145-61.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
228. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). The Court stated that "such
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
between parties to a transaction." Id.
229. See supra notes 68-71 (explaining the invitation offered by Chiarella).
230. The defendant, O'Hagan, was an attorney who used his position to make a $4.3 million
profit off of unsuspecting sellers of Pillsbury stock. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2119-2202. See supra
notes 127-42 (recounting the facts of this case).
231. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
232. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207-08. The fiduciary breach that the Court relies on is based on
the misappropriation of information by one who is entrusted with this information. Id. at 2207.
Though this misappropriation involves deception in that the appropriator uses the information
without telling the owner of the information, this type of conduct has not been the subject of
federal law. Id. Rather it has generally been regulated by state law. Id. In Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, however, the Court said that corporate mismanagement and other state regulated con-
duct was not the proper subject of § 10(b). 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977). See also Krawiec, supra
note 222, at 173-74 (noting that O'Hagan probably "runs afoul" of Santa Fe, and that the requi-
site breach under the misappropriation theory is unrelated to the policy concerns of the securi-
ties laws).
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5. The Court stressed that the misappropriation theory remains con-
sistent with the policy concerns of assuring honest markets and inves-
tor confidence. 233 On the other hand, the majority admits that if the
trader discloses to his source of information that he is going to trade
based on the nonpublic information, then there is no liability under
the misappropriation theory.234 Thus, the disclosure by the trader
prevents a § 10(b) fraud because there is no breach of the duty to
disclose. 235 Although disclosure changes the trade from fraudulent to
non-fraudulent, the adverse effects on the markets and investor confi-
dence remain unchanged: the trader is able to gain a windfall at the
expense of other market participants. While the Court points to the
fact that a principal can seek equitable relief under state law once the
trader has announced his intentions,236 time considerations and finan-
cial expense may prevent the principal from seeking this relief.
The theory also falls short when a trader receives nonpublic infor-
mation in the form of a tip from an insider if the trader has no knowl-
edge of the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.2 37 If a trader receives
a tip from an insider who has not breached a fiduciary duty then the
trader will not be held liable.238 Additionally, it is also possible that a
person could overhear or happen upon nonpublic information and
make a trade based on that information. Once again, there would be
no violation based on the misappropriation theory, but the adverse
effect on the market would be the same.239
There is no good explanation for the difference in treatment be-
tween the "duty-less" trader and the trader bound by a fiduciary duty.
The resulting harm to policy considerations from each type of trader is
the same, and it is the promotion of these policies that is the goal of
§ 10(b) and the O'Hagan ruling. After O'Hagan, the focus is shifted
from fiduciary duties and subsequent breaches to the promotion of
233. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2210.
234. Id. at 2211 n.9. There is no liability "when a person trading on the basis of nonpublic
information has disclosed his trading plans to, or obtained authorization from, the principal-
even though such conduct may affect the securities markets in the same manner as the conduct
reached by the misappropriation theory." Id.
235. Id. at 2208-09. "To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no decep-
tion, there would only have to be disclosure." Id. at 2208; see Krawiec, supra note 222 at 173.
236. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211 n.9.
237. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12. (1980).
238. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212-13. The majority in discussing the Dirks case commented:
"Absent any violation by the tippers, there could be no derivative liability for the tippee." Id.
239. Id. at 2211. "There is "no 'general duty between all participants in market transactions to
forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information."' Id. See Krawiec, supra note 222, at
172-74 (discussing the general ineffectiveness of the misappropriation theory in preventing in-
sider trading).
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honest securities markets and investor confidence. 240 A court follow-
ing this ruling and applying the misappropriation theory, however,
must look to the existence of a breach of a fiduciary duty as a techni-
cal hook on which to extend liability. While this theory is consistent
with the letter of the law and earlier decisions, it is not the most effec-
tive means to accomplish the goals of the law.
B. The Court's Willing Acceptance of Rule 14e-3: The
Advancement of Policy Considerations
The Court used a rational basis test to approve Rule 14e-3 as a valid
weapon against insider trading in the tender offer context.241 Unfor-
tunately, the Court's reasoning on this issue lacks significant analysis.
The majority first pointed to the dual nature of § 14(e) in that it gives
the SEC both definitional and prophylactic rulemaking power in the
tender offer setting.242 The Court stated that it would not decide the
question of the SEC's ability to define "fraudulent" under § 14(e), be-
cause the rule was a valid use of § 14(e)'s prophylactic rulemaking
power.243
In support of this prophylactic power, the Court first cited Congres-
sional intent to use the section as a means of protecting shareholders
and ensuring that disclosure is the market norm.244 The Court then
cited Schreiber for the proposition that § 14(e)'s prophylactic
rulemaking power gave the SEC wide latitude to regulate non-decep-
tive acts as a reasonable means of preventing fraudulent acts.245 By
240. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210.
241. Id. at 2217. "[wle owe the Commission's judgment 'more than mere deference or
weight."' Id. (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977)).
242. Id. at 2215-16. Section 14(e) reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manip-
ulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer .... The [SEC] shall, for
the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1997).
243. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2217.
We need not resolve in this case whether the Commission's authority under § 14(e) to
"define... such acts and practices as are fraudulent" is broader than the Commission's
fraud-defining authority under § 10b, for we agree with the United States that Rule
14e-3(a), as applied to cases of this genre, qualifies under Section 14(e) as a "means
reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent trading."
Id.
244. Id. at 2215.
245. Id. at 2217.
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design, Rule 14e-3 does not require a breach of a fiduciary duty to
impose liability. 246
Finally, the majority concluded that the Court must give more than
mere deferential treatment to the SEC's judgment because Congress
has authorized this agency to prescribe rules.2 47 Thus, the Court used
a minimum rationality test in evaluating Rule 14e-3 as a proper use of
the SEC's rule promulgation powers. Not surprisingly, the majority
approved the rule as a valid use of § 14(e)'s rulemaking authority.248
The Court merely accepted the proffered justification for the rule
without much analysis. The government also argued that it was prob-
able that this rule would reach trading in which a breach of a duty was
likely to occur, but very difficult to prove.249 The Court agreed and
stated that there is a wide circle of people that have access to confi-
dential information in the typical tender offer setting which "may lead
to abuse. '250
This reasoning hardly supports the contention that a breach is likely
to occur in the tender offer setting, and it does not support the notion
that this breach will be difficult to prove. To the contrary, the fact that
there is a significant number of people involved in a tender offer
transaction suggests that it would be easier to obtain proof of a breach
of duty since there are more possible witnesses from which to gather
evidence.251
The majority also failed to provide a guideline for what types of
fraudulent acts Rule 14e-3 is meant to prevent. It limited its holding
to the type of fraud charged against O'Hagan, without stating if the
rule applied to other types of fraud.252 This ruling leaves the extent of
246. Id. at 2215. Rule 14e-3 "creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to ab-
stain or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a preexisting fiduciary duty." Id.
247. Id. at 2217.
248. Id. at 2219.
249. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2218.
250. Id. The Court stated that "the availability of that information may lead to abuse." Id.
251. Id. at 2218 n.20. The Court used the example of a father providing a tip to his son and his
son's wealthy friend about a tender offer. Id. The son borrows money from the wealthy friend
and buys stock in the target company. Id. The Court reasoned that the father will want to
protect his son and not testify against him. Id. The Court concluded that because the only
parties to the transaction would want to protect each other, it would be difficult to prove a
breach of a duty by the son. Id. This would make it impossible to extend liability in this case. It
is not hard to imagine that a tipper would not be willing to protect a tippee if the tipper was
facing possible criminal charges and had no familial connection to the tippee. There are also
many examples of other crimes in which the only witnesses to the crime are the participants to
the crime, yet the government must still meet a more stringent scienter requirement. Id.
252. Id. at 2219. The Court stated: insofar as it serves to prevent the type of misappropriation
charged against O'Hagan, Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper exercise of the Commission's prophylactic
power under § 14(e). Id.
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liability under Rule 14e-3 undecided. The Court also failed to discuss
why it is very difficult to prove a breach of duty in the tender offer
setting for purposes of § 14(e), but not as difficult to prove a breach of
duty for purposes of § 10(b) liability. In failing to address these issues,
the Court gave great deference to the SEC in crafting a criminal regu-
lation which requires very little scienter. 253 Aside from the majority's
concern to provide the SEC as much "latitude" as possible to combat
securities abuses, the Court failed to provide much support for its de-
cision. Furthermore, the Court did not define the scope of liability
under Rule 14e-3, except to say that it reaches the type of fraud
charged against O'Hagan. These factors imply that the majority was
more interested in reaching a particular result than in defining and
explaining the scope of Rule 14e-3.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Future of the Misappropriation Theory
Approval of the misappropriation theory will extend liability under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The central issue in insider trading cases
where the trader-defendant is not a traditional insider focuses on
whether the trader owed a duty to the source of his information. Very
often the trader will owe a duty to the provider of his nonpublic infor-
mation because confidential information is a property right that the
provider has an exclusive right to use. 254 Thus, the trader's intention
to use the principal's property requires disclosure to the principal. 255
This increased liability should make it easier to successfully bring
charges against parties who trade in securities based on nonpublic ma-
terial information serving as a more effective deterrent initially. This
initial effect will probably give the impression that § 10(b) and the
misappropriation theory are adequate in combating insider trading.25 6
253. Id. at 2219. The majority said: "The SEC, cognizant of the proof problem that could
enable sophisticated traders to escape responsibility, placed in Rule 14e-3(a) a 'disclose or ab-
stain from trading' command that does not require specific proof of a breach of fiduciary duty."
Id. This statement and the language of Rule 14e-3 imply that only a showing of negligence is
needed to prove a criminal violation of Rule 14e-3.
254. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
255. Id.
256. In a recent Second Circuit case, the court of appeals upheld the defendant's conviction
under the misappropriation theory by citing to the O'Hagan decision. United States v.
Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit cited O'Hagan in determining that
the misappropriation theory was a valid extension of § 10(b) liability. Id. The court, however,
said that the breach of fiduciary duty did not occur when the defendant used the information to
make a trade, but rather when he initially obtained the information. Id. at 87-88. This explana-
tion differs from the O'Hagan decision. See 117 S. Ct. at 2209. This court also noted the
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It is quite possible, however, for a trader to avoid liability under the
misappropriation theory through disclosure. 25 7 It also possible for a
tippee to avoid liability if he did not know of the tipper's breach of
duty.258 Thus, the rule will not be as effective as it initially appears. 259
Although the aim of the theory is in the right direction, its shortcom-
ings result from the framework in which it operates.
Future courts may embrace a broader theory of liability similar to
the one advanced by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Chiarella.260
The O'Hagan Court appeared very concerned with advancing the pol-
icy considerations that support the insider trading laws and a theory
similar to Justice Blackmun's theory would be very effective in pro-
moting these policies because it would call for the "disclose or ab-
stain" rule in almost all instances. This would certainly promote the
full disclosure goal of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.261
Given the Court's ruling on the validity of Rule 14e-3, it also seems
possible that Congress could amend § 10(b) to make it more like
§ 14(e). If this were the case, it would seem very likely that the SEC
could draft a new Rule 10b-5 that would not specifically require proof
of a breach of duty. Without the requirement of finding a breach of
duty, the SEC could simply assume that a breach had occurred and
impose liability, overcoming the shortcomings of the misappropriation
theory.
B. The Uncertain Future of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3
In addition to the uncertainties of the misappropriation theory, the
Court's treatment of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 leaves many unanswered
questions. First, the Court did not decide if § 14(e) allowed the SEC
to give "fraud" a broader definition than that found in § 10(b) or the
O'Hagan Court's acceptance of Rule 14e-3 as a valid use of § 14(e)'s promulgation powers.
Cusimano, 123 F.3d at 88.
257. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2211 n.9.
258. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this case.
259. See Richard W. Painter et al., supra note 53, at 188-91 (discussing the shortcomings and
uncertainty caused by the O'Hagan decision).
260. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun declared that "it is unnecessary to rest petitioner's conviction on a misappropriation
theory .... I think the petitioner's brand of manipulative trading, with or without such ap-
proval, lies close to the heart of what the securities laws are intended to prevent." Id. Justice
Blackmun would not base the duty to disclose or abstain on the existence of a fiduciary duty, but
rather on the fact that a person has access to confidential information that is not legally available
to others. Id. In his view, any other rule would fall short of serving the purposes of the securities
laws. Id. at 247-51.
261. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994) (describing the act's re-
placement of caveat emptor with full disclosure).
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
common law.262 If the SEC is allowed such power, then the SEC
would seem to have quasi-legislative powers to define criminal con-
duct since it would be able to define the term to meet its objectives. It
is more appropriate to reserve to Congress the power to define and
expand the definition of criminal conduct.
Second, the Court has provided very little guidance in determining
when a § 14(e) promulgation is a reasonably designed means for
preventing fraud. The majority was willing to allow the SEC to have
almost free reign in deciding which of its rules are reasonably
designed, 263 which means that the SEC has almost sole discretion in
deciding when it will prohibit a non-fraudulent act for the sake of
preventing some fraudulent act that might exist in the tender offer
setting. This grants significant power to the SEC in its fight against
insider trading in the tender offer setting.
This lack of guidance provided by the O'Hagan court can be seen in
S.E.C. v. Mayhew,264 which cited O'Hagan as authority for the propo-
sition that Rule 14e-3 is a valid use of § 14(e)'s rulemaking author-
ity.265 The Mayhew court also cited O'Hagan for the proposition that
Congress intended § 14(e) to be a "broad" antifraud remedy in the
tender offer context.266 The section of O'Hagan that the Mayhew
court cites, however, is the Court's discussion of whether § 14(e)'s
rulemaking power is broader than § 10(b)'s rulemaking power, and, as
mentioned before, the Court refused to decide this point.267 The May-
262. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217.
263. Id. The majority said it owed "the Commission's judgment 'more than mere deference."'
Id.
264. S.E.C. v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997).
265. Id. at 49. The court of appeals cited O'Hagan as authority for the proposition that Rule
14e-3 is valid despite its lack of a requirement for a breach of a fiduciary duty. Id. The court
stated:
The Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Hagan.... faced with a claim that Rule 14e-3
exceeded the Commission's authority under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, recently upheld
the validity of Rule 14e-3 which imposes liability on persons who trade on material,
nonpublic information in connection with a tender offer without regard to whether the
trader owes a fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.
Id. (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 53. In this particular case, the court found the defendant liable under Rule 14e-3
for making a trade based on a tip. Id. The court said that the fact that there was a two month
period in between the time the defendant received the tip (and purchased securities) and the
actual tender offer did not bar liability under Rule 14e-3 because § 14(e) is to be interpreted
broadly. Id. The court of appeals cited O'Hagan for the statement: "Moreover, liability can
attach under § 14(e) even though there is a two month lag between the tip and the tender offer.
Congress intended § 14(e) to be a broad antifraud remedy in the area of tender offers." Id.
267. Id. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2216-17. The Court considered both O'Hagan's argument
that § 14(e)'s power was equal to § 10(b)'s power, and the United States' argument that § 14(e)
should be read to give the SEC power to go beyond the common law definition of fraud. Id.
After considering both sides, the Court stated: "We need not resolve in this case whether the
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hew court relied on this portion of the O'Hagan decision despite its
lack of clarity. 268 Thus, a lower court has relied on O'Hagan for sup-
port that § 14(e) is a "broad" antifraud remedy even though the
O'Hagan Court did not attempt to define or limit the breadth of
§ 14(e).
Finally, the Mayhew court cited O'Hagan when discussing § 14(e)'s
"in connection with" requirement, 269 using O'Hagan's explanation of
§ 10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement to try to explain its inter-
pretation of § 14(e)'s "in connection with" requirement.270 The May-
hew court said that the information used by the defendant "had no
value whatsoever" outside of its use in a securities transaction, and
therefore the "in connection with" requirement was satisfied.271 Con-
versely, the O'Hagan Court stated that nonpublic information used in
a securities transaction need not be devoid of all value outside of the
transaction.272 It is unclear from the Mayhew opinion whether that
court realized or followed the O'Hagan court's statement that non-
public information which is used in a transaction can have value
outside of its use in that transaction.
Based on the decision of the Mayhew Court, it appears that the
O'Hagan Court's opinion regarding § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 will give
lower courts the broad discretion in interpreting Rule 14e-3. The
Court should attempt to more clearly define and limit the reach of
§ 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 in order to provide guidance to lower courts
facing Rule 14e-3 questions.
CONCLUSION
Although the O'Hagan Court reached what appears to be a just
result, its path to that result was circuitous and unclear. The Court
strained to reach a semi-coherent misappropriation theory that ex-
tends liability in this case. A more workable and appropriate standard
for insider trading may be to look at whether the trader used the in-
side information for a proper corporate purpose; if not, courts should
Commission's authority under § 14(e) to 'define... such acts and practices as are fraudulent' is
broader than the Commission's fraud-defining authority under § 10b." Id.
268. Mayhew, 121 F.3d at 53.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. The court of appeals stated: "The information had no value whatsoever except 'in
connection with' Mayhew's subsequent purchase of securities in anticipation of the tender offer."
Id. The court went on to cite O'Hagan stating: "Section 10b's 'in connection with' requirement
satisfied, under misappropriation theory, where 'fiduciary's fraud is consummated ...when,
without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities."' Id.
272. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2209-10.
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impose liability. Regarding Rule 14e-3, the Court did not strain itself
at all. Rather it refused to address one issue and then delegated au-
thority to the SEC on another issue, leaving virtually untouched the
question of Rule 14e-3's scope and definition.
The majority looked to the plain language of these statutes and
used the statutory language as a justification for granting the SEC
great power to fight insider trading.273 Looking to the egregious facts
of this case and the policy concerns underlying the securities laws, the
court thought this extension would provide an effective tool for ex-
tending liability in insider trading cases.
While this case is "fair" from a policy standpoint, it is not sound
from a legal standpoint. In both instances, the Court was guided by
policy considerations aimed at attaining fairness in this particular case,
rather than following the precedent established in previous insider
trading cases.
James W. Morrissey
273. Id. at 2206-08 (discussing the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and how the misappro-
priation theory fits within the statutory language); see also id. at 2214-16 (discussing the language
of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 and the fact that this language gave the SEC appropriate discretion in
fighting insider trading in the tender offer context).
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